Who is afraid of philosophy? by García Düttmann, Alexander
1. I am here to express my solidarity with my colleagues and with the stu-
dents at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, and my
support for the campaign «Save Philosophy at Middlesex». I believe that
the unexpected national and international success of this campaign —who
would have thought only a few weeks ago that the announced closure of
a Centre for Philosophy at a British university would trigger such a reac-
tion?— has an import and an impact which point beyond the case of Mid-
dlesex. Many of us, whether students, academics or non-academics, are fed
up with the way in which Philosophy, the Humanities, and Higher Edu-
cation more generally are treated by politicians and administrators, whether
in Britain or on the continent or elsewhere in the world, for example in
Australia.
2. In my statement this evening, I wish to comment briefly on two sentences.
The first sentence reads: «I am afraid that no one is afraid of philosophy».
This is a quote from an e-mail that a friend sent to me. I believe that it
expresses a certain truth but that it would be naïve to think that it tells the
whole truth. The second sentence reads: «Doubtless philosophy in general
has never been attacked and defended». This is a quote from a text writ-
ten in the mid-seventies by the members of GREPH, a French group devot-
ed to the research of the teaching of philosophy, and published in a vol-
ume called «Qui a peur de la philosophie?» («Who is Afraid of Philosophy?»).
3. «I am afraid that no one is afraid of philosophy». Yes, but if no one is afraid
of philosophy, this is not because so many out there in the real world feel
confident enough to relate to it without fear. Let’s admit, at least for the
time being, that there is widespread indifference toward philosophy, though
my hunch is that there exists more interest in it than one would expect.
1. Written for an event at the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) in London (19th of May
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Could it not be then that this indifference is itself a symptom, a symptom
of a hidden or repressed fear, precisely? A fear of what? Of what philosophy
ultimately means: namely an unbiased or disinterested interest in the thing
itself, an interest in the argument for the sake of the argument (but not an
interest that would shy away from dismissing certain arguments or from
inquiring into the limits of argumentation), an interest in the concept
unconcerned with an agenda or an ideology (but not an interest that would
shy away from targeting agendas and ideologies), an interest that exceeds psy-
chological constraints, an interest that will not stop raising questions where
Power would like it to stop. It is the radical and in many instances unbear-
able challenge of philosophy’s hyperbolic idealism, that politicians and
administrators are ultimately afraid of, even if they do not know it or would
shrug off the very idea as absurd.
4. It seems to me that in the past thirty years or so, philosophy has been
undermined both from the outside and from the inside, and that this dou-
ble erosion has something to do with the almost imperceptible fear that
lurks behind the indifference. Philosophy has been undermined from the
outside by the aggressive transformation of the university into a business.
Whatever cannot account for its measurable success and whatever does not
bring in money, has no longer a place in the university, we are told, has no
longer a place in the world, perhaps. That every aspect of academic life, a
life now determined by the imperative of getting external funding, can and
should be assessed and monitored, and that such assessment and moni-
toring will enhance this life, is a fiction and leads to arbitrary measures, as
can be gauged from the decision to close a Centre for Philosophy that was
actually successful according to the adopted criteria. There is something
utterly funny at times about grownups tackling a series of tasks with great
seriousness that they know perfectly well to be meaningless, and that there-
fore will need to be taken all the more seriously. Those who work at uni-
versities are craving for comic relief, though they may not always be aware
of it. Would it bring down the house? It is not a surprise, and has been
repeated again and again, that a subject such as philosophy will be partic-
ularly vulnerable under the circumstances. But it must also be said that
this external tendency, this undermining from the outside, is mirrored
within the institution. A large number of academics, and a number of stu-
dents as well, have endorsed and are still endorsing the transformation of
the university into a business, sometimes even by pretending to be innov-
ative and creative, and often by embracing the confusion between the pri-
vate and the public that seeks to channel and exploit «relaxation» —the
empire of the one-dimensional man or woman has many disguises. Such aca-
demics may be dimly aware of the mediocrity of their minds— just don’t
remind them of what they know already—, they may wish to be promot-
ed, to gain power and recognition, or else they may simply be afraid of not
following the rules, of sticking out their necks when to all appearances
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everybody else is complying with constantly renewed directives. Who,
attending a meeting, does not suspect that the important decisions are a
foregone conclusion? Who does not sense that the Great Inquisitor today
is the Great Administrator who keeps a blog? It should be noted here that
the transformation of the university into a business is regularly presented
as a kind of fateful development, as the way things are going, as a fact that
does not depend on decisions made or not made.
5. Then, as I have already said, I would maintain that philosophy has been
undermined from the inside as well, by handing itself over to two of its
enemies. On the one hand, there is the slick and streamlined professional
philosopher, who may belong to one philosophical tradition or the other,
and who, in order to be successful and be seen as «one of us», knows whom
to acknowledge and whom to ignore, which conference to attend and which
book to read, in which journal to publish and whom better not to quote,
and so on. On the other hand, a series of new disciplines have emerged
which often do not wish to be seen as disciplines and which tend to be
concerned with some form of «culture» or other, some form of «media» or
other, some form of «art» or other. These quasi-disciplines have equally
contributed to the undermining of philosophy by using its concepts to fill
the gaps in their own «practices», and thus often emptying the concepts
of all meaning. It is not by chance that there is a complicity between the
champions of academic drivel and the administration. They tend to be
very good at dealing with applications and forms, and at relentlessly start-
ing new initiatives and projects. Here, a fear of philosophy can surface and
manifest itself in the form of active exclusions. Philosophy is then per-
ceived as a threat to an established jargon or to intellectual limitations and
indolence - after all, engaging with philosophy, coming up with an idea or
a concept, perhaps, means to make quite a huge effort, as Deleuze never
ceased to emphasize. To speak metaphorically, philosophy is seen as a cuckoo
in the little nest one has built for oneself, more often than not with the aid
of philosophy. At Goldsmiths, research students who share an interest in
philosophy and have gathered in a group called InC —as you all know,
the event tonight has been organised by these students— can probably
provide —as I can, too— a few examples of this highly ambiguous fear of
philosophy. Against all odds, and without receiving much financial sup-
port, InC, basically a no-budget initiative, has put on an impressive and
unique series of events over a period of several years now, and I wish to
salute the students who have committed themselves in this way to philos-
ophy.
6. So, to conclude, I would say that we find ourselves in an unprecedented
situation today. Precisely because no one appears to be afraid of philoso-
phy, the fear of philosophy, of its uncompromising and yet not unreflect-
ed fearlessness, is all the more powerful, and for the first time philosophy
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in general is under attack. But this does not mean that it needs to be defend-
ed. As Adorno says, to defend something means to give it up. Philosophy
must, quite simply and forcefully, be affirmed, within and outside acade-
mic institutions.
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